A Contested World
Small states and insurgent movements are rapidly finding new ways to use autonomous weapons to disrupt global commerce. Here's how it can all go wrong.
In early May (‘24), Ukraine, using inexpensively modified Chinese drones, derailed a Russian train, an operational first in the evolution of autonomous weaponry. This event was one of many successful innovations using autonomous weapons we’ve seen over the last four years from
suppressing ground offensives to
disrupting critical systems (i.e., Ukraine’s electrical grid and Russia’s oil sector)
to conducting blockades and interdiction (this train attack is an example).
Furthermore, these innovations weren’t limited to the war in Ukraine. They’re being made worldwide, from Azerbaijan to Iran, Mexico, Gaza, and Yemen. In each case, hard-pressed militaries and non-state guerrilla movements have found that they can radically expand their tactical capabilities and their strategic reach by using inexpensive autonomous weapons. Furthermore, as we’re seeing with the Houthi movement in Yemen, this reach has expanded to the level necessary to disrupt global commerce.
Nearly every day, the US task force in the vicinity of the Red Sea shoots down a Houthi drone blockading shipping in the region. It’s almost as regular as clockwork for this multi-billion dollar military operation.
However, and unfortunately for the US,
It’s sustainable for the Houthis. Due to the low cost of the drones used, the cost to the Houthis to run this operation is negligible — costing hundreds of thousands of dollars to the billions the US is spending to suppress it (a 20-50x return on investment, ROI).
The US suppression effort isn’t working. Despite the presence of the US Navy, drones still get through. As a result, many of the biggest shipping companies are still avoiding the area by routing their ships around the Horn of Africa instead. This lengthy rerouting effort has absorbed 15-20% of the world’s shipping capacity (Maersk) between the Far East and Northern Europe, doubling the cost per container and up to a month in delay.
It’s found a political niche. The Houthis have justified their effort by selectively focusing on ships and shipping lines that are supplying Israel, earning them considerable support worldwide. They have also, and this is critical, made the blockade selective — an agreement negotiated with Russia and China provides their ships safe passage through the region.
On the tactical end, Israel has made significant advances in using autonomous weapons to fight domestic counter-insurgencies. Most saliently, it has directly connected (with little human oversight) its AI targeting system (Lavender, a social credit type system that scores the probability that an individual is an insurgent) to loitering autonomous weapons platforms, making it possible to completely automate the suppression, herding, and kettling of restive urban populations that may be harboring guerrillas.
A Contested World
As diverse as these innovations are, there is one thing these innovations in autonomous weapons have in common: they point to a world where trade, travel, and connectivity can be actively contested. A contested world where small states and even smaller insurgent and criminal groups can use autonomous weapons to;
reliably, inexpensively, and selectively
disrupt, blockade, or redirect trade, travel, and connectivity
on land, air, and sea over vast distances or focused within urban environments.
Now, let's build a worst-case scenario to get an intuitive sense of what a contested world feels like.