The Collapse of Complex Nations
The collapse of the Soviet Union offers a framework for understanding what is currently going on in a globalized US. Let's dig into it for useful insights.
If the US did collapse, what would it look like? Would it be;
An authoritarian networked movement that rapidly seizes government control,
a hot, protracted civil war as networked tribes vie for control or
a rapid political and geographic devolution as we saw with the Soviet Union?
Currently, the leading model is the slouching shoulder shrug of a Soviet-style collapse. Let’s dig into this model to understand why.
"In Russia, normalcy broke down in a series of steps.
First, people stopped being afraid to speak their minds.
Then, they stopped taking the authorities seriously.
Lastly, the authorities stopped taking each other seriously."
Dmitry Orlov's brilliant 2011 book “Reinventing Collapse” and historian Niall Ferguson’s recent “We’re All Soviets Now” detail many parallels between the USSR’s collapse and the situation the US faces today. They are both short reads, well worth reading in full. With these parallels in mind, let’s construct a more comprehensive framework for a Soviet-style US collapse.
‘Victory’
The foundational premise of this model is;
The Cold War profoundly damaged the US and the USSR.
When the USSR collapsed, the US had the opportunity to reorient its decision-making (new goals, new assumptions, etc.) to heal itself of the damage, but it failed to do so. George Washington’s farewell address would have been an excellent place to start for the inspiration required for this reorientation.
As a result of this lack of action, the US is now on the same descent to collapse the Soviet Union experienced in the 90’s.
The Military-Industrial Complex
The central factor contributing to the collapse of the Soviet Union was the unsustainable amount of money it spent on the national security state.
The pressures of the Cold War, combined with a culturally Russian defensive paranoia (Kennen’s central insight in Containment), led them to spend as much as ~20% of their GDP on it (more than double the US burden) and likely far more if the USSR’s internal security was included.
This burden made them vulnerable to economic disruption. For example, a US-led effort to radically reduce the price of oil (the USSR, and now Russia, the largest producer of oil in the world) in the 80s put extreme strain on their economy.
Furthermore, they couldn’t reduce their expenditures because of new strategic threats — from cruise missiles to plans for a “Star Wars” defense.
Victory in the Cold War should have allowed the US to reduce its defense expenditures and balance its budget using the surplus (another recommendation from Washington). Unfortunately, the US couldn’t turn off the military-industrial complex (Eisenhower warned against it in his farewell address after battling it for a decade).
We couldn’t muster the political support needed to reduce its size meaningfully. Furthermore, the millions working for it turned every event into an opportunity to continue it.
For example, the response to 9/11 didn’t just result in the small amount of new money needed for the law enforcement and special operations required to prevent another terrorist incident in the future; it was used to justify a prolonged continuation of the national security state well into the new Century.
Worse, as the threat of terrorism faded, this system found a new way to justify its existence: regime change, NATO expansion, and nation-building.